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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Board of Education v.
Browning:
AN EQUITABLY
ADOPTED CHILD
MAY NOT INHERIT
BY INTESTATE
SUCCESSSION
FROM THE SIBLING
OF THE
EQUITABLY
ADOPTIVE PARENT

In Board of Education v.
Browning, 333 Md. 281,635 A.2d
373 (1994), the Court of Appeals
ofMaryland proscribed inheritance
by intestate succession from the
sister of an equitably adoptive parent. Explaining that equitable adoption is based on a contractual relationship between the equitably
adopted child and parent, the court
held that inheritance by the child
from a party outside of that relationship is precluded.
Lawrence Hutchison legally
adopted his natural daughter, Paula
Browning, in 1921 prior to his
marriage to Marian Gibson in 1922.
In 1984, Marian Hutchison specifically told Browning she had
adopted her; however, after
Marian's death, Browning discovered that formal adoption proceedings had never been instituted.
Thus, Browning was raised as an
adopted daughter even though
Marian Hutchison never formally
adopted her. Eleanor Hamilton,
the sister of Marian Hutchison,
died intestate in 1990 leaving no
known living relatives. Without a
will or statutory legal heirs, the
Board of Education of Montgomery County (the "Board") claimed
it was entitled to Hamilton's estate
pursuant to the Maryland escheat
laws.
Browning filed a complaint
seeking a declaratoryjudgment and
a motion for summary judgment in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, claiming she was a legal
heir of Hamilton. She asserted in
the complaint that as the equitably
adopted daughter of Marian
Hutchison, she was entitled to
inherit Hamilton's estate. The
Board argued that Browning's
complaint failed to state facts to
show she was an equitably adopted
child, and further, even ifequitably
adopted, Browning could not inherit

from the sister of her equitably
adoptive mother as a matter of law.
The circuit court determined
Browning to be equitably adopted
and that as such, she could inherit
Eleanor Hamilton's estate. The
trial court therefore denied the
Board's motion to dismiss and
granted Browning's summary
judgment motion. The Board
appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. Due to the
importance of the issue, the court
of appeals granted certiorari prior
to consideration by the court of
special appeals.
On appeal, the Board continued
to challenge the lower court's ruling
that Browning was indeed equitably
adopted. The court of appeals,
however, found it unnecessary to
address that question. The court
held that even if Browning was
equitably adopted, she could not
inherit by intestate succession from
her equitably adoptive mother's
sister.
To reach this conclusion, the
court first reviewed the principle of
equitable adoption. As a general
rule, adoption is valid only where
statutory requirements are fulfilled.
Browning, 333 Md. at 286, 635
A.2d at 376. However, Maryland
recognizes the doctrine of equitable
-adoption as a narrow exception to
this rule, allowing a court to grant
the child the status of a statutorily
adopted child for the limited
purpose of inheriting property from
the parent. Id. at 287, 635 A.2d at
376.
Equitable adoption is based on
a contractual relationship between
a parent and child which is
supported by consideration and part
performance. Id. As a matter of
justice, courts enforce this contract
to the extent that a child who has
never been formally adopted may
inherit property from the adoptive
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parent. Id. (citing McGarvey v.
State, 311 Md. 233, 533 A.2d 690
(1987)). Maryland upholds the
proposition that a child who "has
faithfully and fully performed the
duties of a natural child to the
foster parents" should inherit from
the estate ofthat parent. McGarvey,
311 Md. 233,533A.2d690(1987)
(quoting Besche v. Murphy, 190
Md. 539,546, 59A.2d499 (1948)).
Turning to the scope of the
doctrine of equitable adoption,
Browning argued that an equitably
adopted child may inherit through
as well as from an equitably
adoptive parent. Browning, 333
Md. at 290, 635 A.2d at 378
(emphasis in original). Because
this was an issue offirst impression
in Maryland, the court relied on
cases ofotherjurisdictions to reach
its holding.
In Menees v. Cowgill, 223
S.W.2d 412 (Mo.1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950), the
Missouri Supreme Court did not
permit an equitably adopted
daughter to inherit from her
adoptive father's sister. The court
reasoned that equitable proceedings
are based upon contract and thus,
only the parentand child are bound.
Therefore, the daughter was not
able to inherit from the collateral
kin of her father. The SupremeCourt of Minnesota reached a
similar result in In re Estate of
Olson, 70 N.W.2d
107
(Minn.1955). The court did not
allow an equitably adopted child to
inherit from his father's brother,
holding that no equities existed
between them.
In support of her claim,
Browning cited FirstNat. Bank in
Fairmont v. Phillips, 344 S.E.2d
201 (W.Va. 1985), where the court
held that an equitably adopted child
could inherit from another child of
an adoptive parent. The court of
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appeals refused to follow the
Phillips' courts holding and
distinguished Phillips because its
holding was limited to its facts, and
thus was inapplicable to
Browning's case. Browning, 333
Md. at 293, 635 A.2d at 379.
Relying on the position taken by
the majority of jurisdictions, the
court held that equitably adopted
children may only inherit directly
from rather than through an
equitably adoptive parent by
intestate succession. Id. at 293,
635 A.2d at 380.
Browning argued that similar
cases from other jurisdictions did
not control because in those cases
the equitably adoptive child claimed
an interest in an estate to which
there was a legal heir. Maintaining
that there was a crucial difference
between these cases and the case at
bar, Browning claimed that a party,
namely the Board of Education,
who was not an heir could not
defeat her claim. Id. at 294, 635
A.2d at 380. The court rejected
this argument and relied on a federal
case which allowed the District of
Columbia to defeat a claim by the
"sister" of an equitably adopted
child. id. (citing In re Estate of
McConnell, 268 F.Supp. 346
(D.C.C. 1967), aff'd, 393 F.2d
665 (D.C.Cir. 1968)). Recognizing
that escheats are not favored by
law, the court nevertheless stated
that Maryland law is clear that if
no legal heir exists, the decedent's
property escheats to the local Board
of Education. Id. at 295,635 A.2d
at 380.
Judge Eldridge, in his
dissenting opinion, generally
contends that an equitably adopted
child should not share in the
intestate estate of the parents'
siblings where legal heirs are living.
Id. at 296, 635 A.2d at 380
(Eldridge, J., dissenting). However,
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when the state and the equitably
adopted child are in dispute, the
estate should pass by intestate
succession to the child. Id.
Furthermore, Judge Eldridge
insisted that Hutchison would have
preferred that Browning inherit her
estate rather than an escheatment
to the Board of Education. id. at
298,635 A.2d at 381 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
The majority, unlike Judge
Eldridge, did not assume
Hutchison's intent. The court
clearly recognized that it is
acceptable for an equitably adopted
child to inherit from an equitably
adoptive parent, however the child
may not inherit through the parent.
Browning prevents inheritance
by an equitably adopted child from
the collateral kin of the adoptive
parent. While the law extends an
equitable remedy to a child who
has not been formally adopted by
allowing inheritance from the
parent, inheriting from those
outside the contractual relationship
is not allowed. Where there are no
legal heirs, an adopted child's
failure to carefully investigate
whether
formal
adoption
requirements have been met may
preclude inheritance from the
adoptive parents' siblings.
Moreover, this case reinforces the
importance of careful estate
planning to accurately reflect a
testator's intent.
- DebraJohnson Singleton

